Friedman and Machlup on the Significance of Testing Economic Assumptions by Melitz, Jacques
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Friedman and Machlup on the
Significance of Testing Economic
Assumptions
Jacques Melitz
Tulane University
1965
Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84889/
MPRA Paper No. 84889, posted 26 April 2018 23:14 UTC
1 
 
Friedman and Machlup on the Significance of Testing Economic Assumptions1 
J. Melitz 
Journal of Political Economy, 1965, LXXIII, pp. 37-60 
Summary: This article questions Milton Friedman’s methodological position in a famous 
essay dating to 1948 where he questions the validity of tests of the assumptions of 
economic theory. Valid tests, he maintains, by and large, concern the empirical 
implications of hypotheses derived from the theory. The truth or falsehood of assumptions 
is “largely irrelevant.” In response, this article argues that Friedman’s position is 
questionable but for different reasons depending on the nature of the assumptions. 
“Auxiliary assumptions” concern the environment in which the test is supposed to take 
place. “Generative assumptions” concern the postulates or theorems from which the 
hypothesis is derived.  If auxiliary assumptions are false, all test results bear less weight, 
whether are confirmatory or disconfirmatory. If generative assumptions are false, positive 
results confer less confirmation on the hypothesis. The article further questions Friedman’s 
famous proposal to treat the assumptions of economic theory as “as if” statements, which 
are not really supposed true but simply taken for granted. The article goes on to question a 
related one by Fritz Machlup agreeing with Friedman about the irrelevance of tests of 
“generative assumptions.” Unlike Friedman, however, Machlup stands on the authority of 
philosophers of science, who, he claims, maintain that theoretical postulates in science 
should be regarded as “rules” that must be followed. 
I. Introduction 
 The spectacular advance of modern science is usually attributed very largely to the 
development of deductively related bodies of general statements known as theories. The 
construction of theories in science has not only brought improvement in order and clarity and 
broadened the scope of empirical generalization but has also scored extraordinary predictive 
successes, some of which were never even envisaged when the theories began. No wonder that, as 
awareness of the possibility of “social sciences” grew in the nineteenth century, there emerged an 
enormous zeal for the erection of social theories. Of the social theories that thrived during the 
nineteenth century, the most viable one has proven to be an offspring of the preceding century, 
when this general zeal had not yet begun, that is, economic theory. Despite the venerability of 
economic theory at present, it still does not command nearly as much respect as some of the 
theories in the physical sciences. This is, of course, a rank understatement: for well over a century, 
economic theory has been subject to frequent attacks, including completely subversive attempts. 
The theory and its assumptions have been the victims not only of constant opposition but of abuse.2 
                                                          
1 I owe an inestimable debt to Carl G. Hempel and Paul Benaccerraf for guidance and criticism in the early 
stages of preparation of this paper some six or seven years ago. I have also benefited from comments by 
Gaston V. Rimlinger. 
2 To illustrate, without attempting to be compendious: Thorstein Veblen (1898); Barbara Wootton, Lament for 
Economics (1938); and Sidney Schoeffler (1955). 
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In the face of such extreme antagonism, partisans have traditionally armed themselves with some 
sort of a reasoned reply. 
 During the period 1880-1920 the friends and advocates of economic theory adopted on the 
whole a moderate, conciliatory stance.  They agreed that economic theory made false assumptions, 
and admitted that the value of the theory depended greatly on the degree of accord between the 
assumptions and the facts. Yet they insisted, first, that the assumptions did correspond broadly with 
events; and second, that the sacrifice of some accuracy for simplicity was justified in view of the 
complexities of facts. Further, they emphasized the importance of combining the use of simplifying 
assumptions with several protective measures : (1) the pursuit of intensive inductive study in all 
areas of economic, whether closely related to economic theory or not ; (2) the determination of 
reasonable proximity between major assumptions and facts prior to any application of economic 
theory to practice ; and (3) the alteration of theoretical assumptions, to whatever degree possible, in 
keeping with the particular case involved.3 
 With the notable advance of the purely logical branch of economic theory in the 1920’s and 
1930’s, this conciliatory support of economic theory lost enormous appeal among theorists. A 
tendency arose, partly unconscious, to avoid the impression that economic theorists bore the 
responsibility to make their assumptions as realistic as they could, given practical limitations in 
knowledge, returns to additional theoretical invention, and time. Increasingly, economic theory was 
described in a manner suggesting no positive declarations about facts. Concomitantly, some narrow 
characterizations of economic theory took hold, such as “box of analytical tools”, “filing cabinet”, 
“conceptual framework”, and “procedural device”. A growing number of people also hinted broadly, 
both inside and outside the classroom, that theory is its own reward. 
 In 1948 Milton Friedman tried to supply a logical foundation for the developing attitude that 
the realism of assumptions is not a genuine, or is only a secondary concern. While granting that the 
assumptions of economic theory are false, he denied any significant resulting handicap. In his view, 
assumptions must simply work, that is, yield reliable results. Whether or not assumptions correspond 
with the facts is – with a few reservations – without interest. Since, according to Friedman, all 
previous attacks on economic theory had been founded principally on observed discrepancies 
between economic assumptions and facts, these attacks were mostly beside the point.4 In 1955 Fritz 
Machlup joined forces with Friedman, claiming to bring with him the support of the experts in the 
philosophy of science and logic and of a whole tradition in economics (or “political economy”). 
Machlup, in fact, side with Friedman only with regard to so-called “fundamental assumptions” but 
still, on this count alone, must be viewed as an ally.5 
 This paper attempts to show that Friedman and Machlup offer an exaggerated defense of 
economic theory. Previous attempt to show this in connection with Friedman are all, in my opinion, 
somewhat unsatisfactory, by virtue of incompleteness if nothing else.6 The argument presented here 
                                                          
3 See John Neville Keynes (1891); Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics (1961), passim, esp. pp. 24-31, 636-
46; Henry Sidgwick (1901, pp. 35-52 and 1913, pp. 133-7). For highly similar views, see Vilfredo Pareto (1896-
97, I, pp. 304-5, II, 1-8 and 1927, pp. 1-39) and Knut Wicksell (1934, I, pp. 9-11). 
4 Milton Friedman (1948). 
5 Fritz Machlup (1955). 
6 See Tjalling C. Koopmans (1957); Eugene Rotwein (1959); Ernest Nagel (1963; and Paul Samuelson (1963). 
While broadly in agreement with all of these writings, I am particularly in close accord with Koopmans and the 
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is that the most judicious defense of economic theory is the one that was prevalent in the 1880-1920 
period. Thus, my general thesis is that unrealism of assumptions is a serious drawback, granted that 
inaccurate assumptions may be sufferable and indeed wise. I will try to show, further, that tests of 
economic assumptions – all economic assumptions, regardless of categorization – are valuable and 
bear implications for economics, apart from psychology, sociology, history, or any other bordering 
discipline. The discussion focuses first on Friedman’s position, then on Machlup’s, and the article 
conclude with a few summary remarks. 
 
II – The Friedman Thesis 
A – Thesis and qualifications 
 Friedman maintains that the accuracy of assumptions is not pertinent to the test of a 
hypothesis. In his view, the validity of any statement can be determined only by checking the truth of 
its implications. To contemplate the realism of assumptions in testing a hypothesis is wrong. His 
section on “The Significance and Role of the ‘Assumptions’ of a Theory” qualify this argument in 
several ways, and it may be best to observe these qualifications at once. 
 First, Friedman recognizes a difficulty in his position if a statement (A) is used to derive a 
hypothesis (B) while in a different context, B serve to derive A. A simple example, slightly adapted 
from the illustration in Friedman’s essay, may be presented. Imperfect competition, together with 
several other assumptions, implies price stability, but under a different set of conditions, price 
stability implies imperfect competition. Thus, imperfect competition may be an assumption of a 
hypothesis of price stability and vice versa. In cases of this sort, Friedman admits, evidence bearing 
on either statement would be relevant in determining the validity of the other.  To quote : “What are 
called the assumptions of a hypothesis can be used to obtain some indirect evidence on the 
acceptability of the hypothesis in so far as the assumptions can themselves be regarded as 
implications of the hypothesis… .”7 However, he softens the impact of this concession by maintaining 
that “in so far as the assumptions can themselves be regarded as implications of the hypothesis”, the 
realism of the assumptions “generally refer[s] to a class of phenomena different from the class which 
the hypothesis is designed to explain”. In his view, “the weight attached to this indirect evidence 
depends on how closely related we judge the two classes of phenomena to be.”8 
 Further, Friedman acknowledge that the confirmation of an assumption is partial support for 
a hypothesis: 
“Suppose it can be shown it [The hypothesis] is equivalent to a set of assumptions including 
the assumption that man seeks his own interest. The hypothesis then gains indirect plausibility from 
the success for other classes of phenomena of hypotheses that can also be said to make this 
assumption; at least, what is being done here is not completely unprecedented or unsuccessful in all 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
philosopher Nagel. For some generally favorable appraisals of Friedman’s position, mixed, except in the first 
case, with light criticism, see Campbell R. McConnell (1955); Kurt Klappholz and Joseph Agassi (1959); and 
George C. Archibald (1959). 
7 Friedman (1948, p. 28). 
8 Friedman (1948, p. 28). 
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other uses.”9 
 Finally, as I understand him, Friedman concedes that, whenever a satisfactory test is absent, 
the realism of assumptions may contribute toward the evaluation of a hypothesis. In his words: 
The decisive test is whether the hypothesis works for the phenomena it purports to explain. 
But a judgment may be required before any satisfactory test of this kind has been made, and, 
perhaps, when it cannot be made in the near future, in which case, the judgment will have to be 
based on the inadequate evidence available.10 
 In the light of these qualifications, the opening description of Friedman’s thesis may seem to 
exaggerate his position. Indeed, he is careful never to say that the realism of assumptions is 
“irrelevant” without adding the adverb “largely”.11 Nevertheless the qualifications play a minor, 
rather inconspicuous role in his essay as a whole. They appear after the close of the main arguments, 
which are stated quite categorically. Moreover, Friedman’s attitude toward past and prospective 
tests of economic assumptions reveals an extremely low degree of concern over his qualifications. In 
disputing previous tests of profit maximization, Friedman not only questions the workmanship of the 
experiments, but denies the logical basis for them. The unqualified version of Friedman’s thesis, 
therefore, presents a reasonably accurate image of his position, and at the very least, this version of 
his thesis requires concentrated attention. 
 
B – Argument 1 : The Inverse relation of realism and abstraction 
 In arguing his position, Friedman opens with an avowedly paradoxical view. “To be 
important”, he maintains, “a hypothesis must be descriptively false in its assumptions”. The main 
relevant paragraph may be quoted in full: 
“In so far as a theory can be said to have ”assumptions” at all, and in so far as their “realism” 
can be judged independently of the validity of predictions, the relation between the significance of a 
theory and the “realism” of its “assumptions” is almost the opposite of that suggested by the view 
under criticism. Truly important and significant hypotheses will be found to have “assumptions” that 
are wildly inaccurate descriptive representations of reality, and, in general, the more significant the 
theory, the more unrealistic the assumptions (in this sense). The reason is simple. A hypothesis is 
important if it “explains” much by little, that is, if it abstracts the common and crucial elements from 
the mass of complex and detailed circumstances surrounding the phenomena to be explained and 
permits valid predictions on the basis of them alone. To be important, therefore, a hypothesis must 
be descriptively false in its assumptions; it takes account of, and accounts for, none of the many 
other attendant circumstances, since its very success shows them to be irrelevant for the 
phenomena to be explained.”12  
 Clearly, Friedman is correct in asserting that the provision of simple and reliable hypotheses 
with wide application requires considerable abstraction. On what ground, however, does he claim 
                                                          
9 Friedman (1948, p. 29). 
10 Friedman (1948, p. 30). 
11 Cf. Rotwein (1959, p. 555, note 6, and pp. 567-68). See also Koopmans (1957, pp. 137-39). 
12 Friedman (1948, pp. 14-15). 
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that abstraction involves the use of false assumptions? Evidently, Friedman considers abstraction as 
implying the assumption that some aspects of reality are absent. It is admittedly true that, in 
ordinary English usage, “assume that x is absent” may be substituted for “abstract from x” in many 
contexts. There is no meaningful sense, however, in which a hypothesis may be said to require the 
assumption that what it abstracts from is absent. No hypothesis hinge on such an assumption in any 
way. For instance, the statement that the marginal productivity of factors is inversely related to 
quantity involves abstraction from the sequence in which goods are produced. But the statement 
does not rest upon the assumption that good are produced without any time relation to one 
another. In abstracting, we leave some facts out of consideration. This commits us to the view that 
these facts do not matter, not to the assumption that the fact do not exist. 
 Further problems arise due to Friedman’s failure expressly to limit his use of the term 
“assumption” in the previous quotation to allegation of the absence of perceptible facts. In saying 
that “important assumptions must be descriptively false”, Friedman seems to argue that abstraction 
involves false allegation beyond the mere assertion that certain observable aspects are gone. This 
suggestion cannot be seriously contemplated. Abstraction is clearly consistent with the exclusion of 
false classes of implications from statements, and cannot require the admission of false information. 
In fact, as Friedman would probably agree despite his opposite suggestion, abstraction is the major 
instrument for achieving scope without sacrificing accuracy. 
 To elaborate, the exercise of everyday concepts and terms almost invariably leads to error in 
attempts to develop broad generalizations. Abstraction, and the subsequent introduction of 
technical terms, allows the elimination of ambiguities and exceptions from statements. As long as 
difficulties arising in the use of everyday terms can be traced to some specific classes of implications 
in a statement, increased abstraction enables superior formulation. Countless examples are available 
in economics. Thus, to present a simple case, reliance on ordinary concepts and terms poses serious 
obstacles in defining the general relation of buyers’ behavior to price. Yet the use of highly abstract 
concepts and terms make possible the compact and trustworthy statement that “the demand for all 
non-inferior goods is negatively sloping”.13 
 In conclusion, the relationship between abstraction and truth is not as recondite as Friedman 
would have everyone believe. Quite conformably with prevalent suppositions, abstraction facilitates 
the attainment of truth, and does not necessitate the acceptance of false assumptions, or immersion 
in “unrealism” of any sort.14 
 
C – Argument 2 : The uninformativeness of knowledge of discrepancies between assumptions and 
facts 
 Next, Friedman set forth a more substantial argument, evolved with the aid of an intriguing 
illustration. Though Friedman’s presentation is intricately bound up with his illustration, a general 
formulation of the argument is possible. The starting-point, which remains somewhat implicit in his 
text, is that assumptions need only be approximated. That is, some finite departure from an 
assumption can be admitted in all or nearly all cases. The tolerable degree of discrepancy, 
                                                          
13 For a highly illuminating and developed example see Carl G. Hempel (1958a). 
14 Cf. Nagel (1963, pp. 214-16). 
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theoretically speaking, can exceed any perceived deviation. Thus, while the acceptable deviation is 
sometimes discernible only with the use of refined instruments, at other times it may be evident to 
the unassisted senses. Since the acceptable deviation between assumptions and facts can be either 
“large” or “small”, knowledge of the actual magnitude of a discrepancy, by itself, yields meager, 
nearly useless information. The proper way to resolve whether an assumption is adequately fulfilled 
is to check the observable implications of the hypothesis in question. If the implications are true, the 
assumption is warranted. Otherwise, the assumption must be rejected. It follows (barring the 
aforementioned special circumstances which Friedman discusses later) that the actual 
correspondence between assumptions and reality is irrelevant. To quote the central passage: 
“We may start with a simple physical example, the law of falling bodies. It is an accepted 
hypothesis that … the distance travelled by a falling body in any specified time is given by the formula 
s = ½ gt2, where s is the distance travelled in feet and t is time in seconds. The application of this 
formula to a compact ball dropped from the roof of a building is equivalent to saying that a ball so 
dropped behaves as if it were falling in a vacuum. Testing this hypothesis by its assumptions 
presumably means measuring the actual air pressure and deciding whether it is close enough to zero. 
At sea level the air pressure is about 15 pound per square inch. Is 15 sufficiently close to zero for the 
difference to be judged insignificant? Apparently it is, since the actual time taken by a compact ball 
to fall from the roof of a building to the ground is very close to the time given by the formula. 
Suppose, however, that a feather is dropped instead of a compact ball. The formula then gives wildly 
inaccurate results.  Apparently, 15 pounds per square inch is significantly different from zero for a 
feather but not for a ball.”15 
 Some aspects of Friedman’s position can hardly be disputed. There is no question, for 
instance, that many discrepancies between assumptions and reality are quite acceptable. He is also 
correct in holding that mere size cannot determine whether a discrepancy is large or small. Whether 
15 pounds air pressure, or any other positive amount less than infinity, is significantly greater than 
zero, to echo Friedman, clearly depends on the experiment on hand. One degree of seller influence 
over price will invalidate the assumption of perfect competition in some instances, but not others. 
Does this mean that the disparity between an assumption and reality has no bearing on the testing of 
a hypothesis? 
 To cope with this question, a distinction must first be introduced between two types of 
assumptions: (1) statements which are used in conjunction with the hypothesis in order to deduce 
predictions; and (2) statements which serve in deriving the hypothesis itself. For want of better 
names, the two types may be referred to, respectively, as “auxiliary” and “generative” assumptions. 
Some frequently employed assumptions usually function in one role rather than the other. In 
economics, for instance, “ceteris paribus” is typically an “auxiliary” assumption and “profit 
maximization” a “generative” assumption. But logically speaking, every assumption may serve in 
either capacity, depending on the particular test involved. To illustrate, the assumption of perfect 
competition may be used is deriving the hypothesis, say, that all firms in industry Y produce where 
marginal cost equals price, and may therefore function as a “generative” assumption. However, in 
relation to the hypothesis, say, that every perfectly competitive firm in industry Y produces where 
marginal cost equal marginal revenue, perfect competition is an “auxiliary” assumption. This 
                                                          
15 Friedman (1948), pp. 16-17. 
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hypothesis does not presuppose perfect competition, but will only yield implications about the 
behavior of particular firms under the assumption that those firms are perfectly competitive.16 In 
Friedman’s example, the assumption of a vacuum is clearly an “auxiliary” one.17 His argument, 
however, is intended to apply to “generative” as well as “auxiliary” assumptions, and thus must be 
examined with regard to both.18 
 In respect to “auxiliary” assumptions, consider a hypothesis, H, which, like any ordinary 
hypothesis, is expressible as saying that if certain type of conditions, C1, C2,…, Cn, are realized, a 
certain type of event, E, occurs. H does not yield any predictions alone, but only in conjunction with a 
set of statements Ax, affirming that the conditions, C1, C2,…, Cn, are true.19 The members of Ax are 
“auxiliary” assumptions. Suppose, in accord with a fundamental implicit understanding in Friedman’s 
argument, that the maximum tolerable discrepancy between C1, C2,…, Cn, and the facts is not known. 
Now imagine that by using H and Ax together a statement about a specific spatio-temporal location, 
namely, an observation statement, 0, is derived.  
 If 0 is found to be true, then by inductive logic, both H and Ax acquire a degree of 
confirmation. That is, the outcome increases the probability that both H and Ax are true. However, it 
may be shown that any evidence contrary to Ax will also play a role in the interpretation of the test 
result. Given any deviation between Ax and reality, then along with the chance that experimental 
conditions conform adequately to the requirements, it is also possible that the facts fall outside the 
boundary conditions for testing H. If this possibility should hold, H would be consistent with false 
results. Thus, as long as the facts do not correspond fully with Ax, the truth of 0 is not necessarily 
favorable to H. Consequently, the greater the evidence opposed to Ax, the lower the degree of 
confirmation which the truth of 0 confers upon H. This reasoning applies without modification to 
Friedman’s experiment with the compact ball. In this example, the accuracy of the predicted time of 
fall increases the probability of truth of the law of falling bodies and the assumption of a vacuum. 
However, the presence of 15 pounds of air pressure per square inch admits the possibility that the 
test is faulty, and thereby diminishes the significance of the result. In arriving at a different 
conclusion, Friedman simply ignores the chance of an invalid experiment. 
                                                          
16 I do not mean to exclude the possibility of a particular statement serving both as an “auxiliary” and 
“generative” assumption at once in an experiment. A simple illustration of this possibility can easily be 
constructed. Suppose that increasing marginal cost is among the assumptions employed in deriving the 
hypothesis that a fall in the output of butter will result in a rise in the price of margarine. In testing this 
hypothesis, we may determine that the output of butter has fallen without immediate evidence of the fall, 
relying mainly on the probable impact of medical reports about the cholesterol content of butter, and the 
blanket assumption of increasing marginal cost. Should this be done, increasing marginal cost would function 
both as an “auxiliary” and a “generative” assumption of the hypothesis. 
17 Cf. Nagel ((1963), p. 212. 
18 In developing the distinction between “generative” and “auxiliary” assumptions, I have chosen to avoid the 
conventional distinction between (1) “fundamental assumptions” and theorems and (2) assumptions “which 
refer to the antecedent clause of a conditional theoretical statement” (see Nagel (1963)). The latter two-part 
distinction divides statements on the basis of an accepted definition of a theory, and results in a fairly defined 
list of “fundamental assumptions” and theorems and an automatic exclusion of most assumptions from this 
“theoretical” group. On the other hand, my distinction is purely functional and permits any statement to 
belong to either the “generative” or the “auxiliary” classification, to shift from one to the other group, and 
even to belong to both groups on occasion. Since some economic assumptions sometimes function as 
“generative” and at other times as “auxiliary” assumptions, this classification has clear expository value. 
19 For further exposition, see the classic paper by Hempel and Paul Oppenheim (1953). 
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 Suppose, next, that O is tried and found false. As long as the experiment deserves attention, 
or, in other words, is not manifestly a fraud, the result increases the probability that H is false. But 
the more the discrepancy between assumed conditions and reality, the greater the chance that the 
requisite test conditions are unfulfilled. Consequently, the greater is this discrepancy, the less reason 
there is to expect H to yield true implications, and the less disconfirmatory is the falsehood of O. In 
Friedman’s example of the feather, therefore, the false prediction weakens the probability that the 
law of falling bodies is true, but the actual degree of environmental air pressure reduces the weight 
of the result. Friedman manages somehow to reach a strikingly different conclusion. He interprets 
the false predicted time of fall to mean that the assumption of a vacuum is false while the law of 
falling bodies is true. It may be readily seen that, if this interpretation could be logically sustained, all 
contradictory results would be attributable to the experimental environment, and no hypothesis 
could ever be disconfirmed. When a prediction is false, we must allow for the possibility that the 
hypothesis – in this case, the law of falling bodies – is wrong. The logician Carl G. Hempel advances 
this point in a somewhat different context, while, by sheer coincidence, employing the same 
example: 
Let us imagine, by way of analogy, a physicist propounding the hypothesis that under ideal 
conditions, namely in a vacuum near the surface of the Earth, a body falling freely for t seconds will 
cover a distance of exactly 16 t2 feet. Suppose now that careful experiment yields results differing 
from those required by the hypothesis. Then clearly the physicist cannot be content simply to infer 
that the requisite ideal conditions were not realized: in addition to this possibility, he has to allow for 
the alternative that the hypothesis under test is not correct.20 
 The unusual persuasiveness of Friedman’s conflicting conclusion in his illustration can be 
explained. In his example, there are covering general laws enabling fairly accurate predictions of the 
magnitude of the error which the law of falling bodies will yield both in the instance of the feather 
and the compact ball. In addition, the reader knows beforehand, on the basis of general experience 
and education, that the law of falling bodies is liable to give a fairly accurate forecast of the time of 
fall of the compact ball, but will necessarily yield miserable results in the experiment of the feather. It 
is this prior knowledge, rather than the test results, which account for the reasonable appearance of 
Friedman’s inferences. Supposing that all ground for anticipating the outcome of his experiment 
were removed, say, by the substitution of x and y for the terms “feather” and “compact ball”, then 
the lack of justification for his conclusion would become patent.21 
 To summarize the main conclusions attained thus far in this section, given ignorance of the 
extent to which deviations between “auxiliary” assumptions and the facts can be tolerated, all 
evidence opposed to these assumptions increases the ambiguity of test results. Regardless of the test 
outcome, any discrepancy between “auxiliary” assumptions and reality raises some likelihood that 
the experiment is invalid. As a consequence, the lower the evidential support for Ax, the smaller the 
significance of both positive and negative results. The realism of “auxiliary” assumptions, thus, is 
                                                          
20 Hempel (1952), p. 78 (the title of the paper is not present in the book, but appears on the reprint). Cf. 
Andreas G. Papandreou (1963) and Archibald (1959, pp. 61-62, and 1963a). 
21 Cf. Koopmans (1957), p. 139. 
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plainly relevant.22 
 Friedman’s argument may now be examined with regard to “generative” assumptions. 
Suppose H is derived from a set of statements or “generative” assumptions, Ag ; and presume, for the 
sake of simplicity, that no member of Ag belong to Ax. Now consider the significance of evidence 
opposed to Ag with regard to H. 
 Unlike testimony conflicting with Ax, such evidence would not interfere with the 
interpretation of outcomes of any tests of H. “Generative” assumptions are not logically required in 
deducing observation statements. Consequently, whatever the facts with respect to Ag, the results of 
checking observation statements derived from H and Ax can be unambiguously interpreted as either 
for or against H. Together with this point, it may be noted that the falsehood of Ag would not 
preclude the truth of H. False assumptions, like all other false statements, may bear true and non-
trivial implications. The statement that all animal can fly, for instance, correctly implies that under a 
wide variety of circumstances, all winged animals can fly. As long as any false matter included in Ag is 
not also contained in H, the falsehood of Ag is perfectly compatible with the truth of H. In principle, 
therefore, no mere volume of evidence contradicting Ag need cause H to be abandoned. 
Furthermore, concurrent with a large amount of such contradictory evidence, H may enjoy great 
predictive success, and possess high confirmation.23 
                                                          
22 In his article, Rotwein (1959, pp. 556-64) argues to the same effect, maintaining that under positive air 
pressure, a true test outcome does not necessarily support the law, and that “the probable inaccuracy of the 
prediction grow as the values of the variables of the given case depart from those under which we have been 
led to expect the prediction” (ibid., p. 563). But, unfortunately, he rest his argument on some obscure 
considerations, including the nature of causality and human predispositions toward chance, and does not 
adequately emphasize the logical issues raised by Friedman’s position. 
The argument in the text regarding “auxiliary assumptions” also emerges quite clearly in Papandreou 
(1958 and 1963). I am, however, quite skeptical regarding Papandreou’s general emphasis. He seems to be 
largely preoccupied with the fact that, unless the truth of “auxiliary” assumptions can be ascertained, 
hypotheses cannot be – and the term here is quite crucial – refuted. He builds his distinction between 
“theories” and “models” on the issue of possible refutation, and devotes much attention to the types of logical 
structures which hypotheses may assume in order to be refutable if they derive from a “model” (consisting of 
irrefutable statements) rather than a “theory” (refutable) (see Papandreou (1958, pp. 8-9, 101-20 [esp. 116-
17], and 141, and 1963)). The trouble with this perspective, in my opinion, is that although general scientific 
statements may be capable of refutation in principle, as a rule scientific hypotheses are rejected because of 
disconfirmation, or in other words, on ground of high probability of error. The main reason for this fact is that 
even in the most advanced sciences, as Friedman suggests, there is usually room for doubting whether the 
appropriate conditions for an experiment were adequately fulfilled. Consequently, as long as statements can 
be disconfirmed, which is true of those in Papandreou’s “models”, I do not see why the issue of refutability, as 
such, should be of particular concern. This criticism applies, a fortiori, to Geoffrey P.E. Clarkson (1963). Clarkson 
utterly confuses the issues of refutation and disconfirmation (see, for example, pp. 21-22, 82-83, 142). He 
maintains, contrary to the foregoing text, that if “auxiliary assumptions” are not known to be “true”, in the 
strict sense, the results of experiments are neither confirmatory nor disconfirmatory (see pp. 95-96 in 
particular). He also bases a whole program of reform of existing consumer theory essentially on the absence of 
refutability of this theory, which he interprets as implying lack of “empirical meaning”. 
23 In his attempt to refute Friedman, Clarkson (1963) argues in sharp opposition to these views that “the 
prediction of an event can only be employed as a means of testing a theory when some parts of the theory 
have already been well confirmed” (p. 90), and moreover, contrary to his own position at some points (for 
example, p. 80), that “the derived laws [of the theories of utility and demand] could be empirically confirmed if 
and only if the basic postulate were empirically confirmed” (p. 103). This view rests on a confusion between 
“auxiliary” and “generative” assumptions, or perhaps more appropriately in this context, between “antecedent 
conditions” and “general theoretical statements”. Proceeding on the basis of an example where the major 
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 Yet these factors do not establish Friedman’s case. While the falsehood of Ag does not thwart 
the testing of H or refute the hypothesis out of hand, it may nevertheless reduce the probability that 
H is true. If Friedman’s thesis is to be meaningful, he must be maintaining, in effect, that evidence 
opposed to Ag would not raise the odds against H. Framed in this manner, his position is extremely 
weak. 
 In case Ag is true, then all of its implications, including H, must be true. However, if Ag is false, 
then some of its implications must be false, and these implications may affect the substance of H. 
Whatever the past success of H may be, should the hypothesis bear false content, it may yield false 
predictions in the future. Thus, broadly speaking, the more of evidence conforms to Ag the greater 
the rational basis for confidence in H; and vice versa, the less this evidence agree with Ag, the less 
this basis for confidence.24 Furthermore, it may also be observed that H may derive an important 
measure of its existing support from the testimony favorable to Ag. If Ag did not possess sufficient 
factual corroboration to warrant some faith in its conclusions, this assumption would most likely not 
be used to develop hypotheses or hunches. There is every reason to think, therefore, that a marked 
reduction in the evidential basis for Ag would notably undermine H. In fact, in cases where 
hypotheses derive from a well-established general theory, the bulk of their support often stems from 
the theory. There are surely many instances in the physical sciences where hypotheses have been 
dismissed only because some covering law or theories had come under serious question.  
D – Argument 3: The presence of “undesigned” classes of implications. 
 Friedman, however, is not satisfied to maintain, as the preceding arguments would imply, 
that if assumptions work they should be used, regardless of the extent of their unrealism. In addition, 
he holds that false information contained in assumptions may not concern classes of implications 
which the hypothesis is “designed to explain.” Every hypothesis, he believes, harbors some 
implications which are completely without interest, and only findings concerning the other 
implications are pertinent. This argument, it may be noted, is not entirely consistent with his 
previous stand. If false information can be countenanced with complete equanimity, there is no need 
to plead that some of the implications of assumptions are “undesigned”. Evidently, Friedman 
recognizes that false assumptions pose the danger of false predictions, and thus, that false 
assumptions have a certain likelihood not to “work”.25 
 The notion that hypotheses contain “undesigned” classes of implications has serious merit. 
Every hypothesis (H) is limited to some specific classes of event by conditional clauses and other 
verbal restrictions. Each condition for the application of H, for instance, eliminates a whole class of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
hypothesis has the form “if R, then S”, Clarkson concludes correctly that unless R is true, the truth of S does not 
necessarily support the hypothesis. However, he treats R as a general theoretical statement, whereas, of 
course, R is an “antecedent condition” (or an “auxiliary” assumption) in the example and, even if occasionally 
employed elsewhere in a “generative” role, can hardly be taken to be a “general theoretical statement”. (In 
order to crosscheck this point, consider first that R cannot logically imply S or the hypothesis would simply be R, 
and next, that the economic postulates and theorems do not appear as subordinate clauses of more general 
economic statements). Clarkson’s error underlines the importance of the related distinctions between 
“antecedent conditions” and “general theoretical statements”, and “auxiliary” and “generative” assumptions 
(see pp. 88-92, and compare with pp. 19-20 where the same reasoning is correctly presented in relation to 
“antecedents”). 
24 Cf. Nagel (1963), p. 215 ; Rotwein (1959), pp. 568-69, and also William J. Baumol (1959), p. 6. 
25 Cf. Rotwein (1959), p. 560, note 5, and the two paragraphs extending on pp. 560-61, and pp. 565-67. 
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implications which, in the absence of the condition, would follow from H together with its “auxiliary” 
assumptions (Ax). There is always a chance that these conditions are insufficiently restrictive in 
various ways, or that the sentence component of H asserting what happens under these conditions is 
too comprehensive. As presently stated, H and Ax may admit various classes of implications that 
concern types of events which the investigators are not interested in explaining or classes of 
implications which they have overlooked and would not accept upon notice. There are, in fact, some 
general reasons to think that most scientific statements are never perfectly consistent with the 
researcher’s proper empirical interests and intentions. First of all, the assertion of all necessary 
qualifications and limitations of scope would often require intense consideration of outside 
problems, perhaps in different fields. In addition, this assertion would frequently cost an inordinate 
amount of time and resources from the perspective of current concerns.  
 However, the likelihood that negligible kinds of discrepancies exist between economic 
assumptions and facts is not a warrant for discarding any contradictory test evidence. Before any 
negative result can be safely dismissed, it is necessary to be able to discern the “undesigned” classes 
of implications. Friedman views this ability as present to an important degree in economics. 
According to him, every hypothesis in economic theory is attended by a set of rules defining the class 
of phenomena which the hypothesis is supposed to explain.26 While these rules are inexact, and 
Friedman deplores the failure to devote greater attention to their elaboration, he believes that “to a 
considerable extent the rules can be formulated explicitly.”27 
 The issue of the existence of these rules can be examined, first, from a highly common-sense 
point of view. If economic rules of application of the sort which Friedman describes can be 
formulated to any significant degree, then what are some examples? What, for instance, is a rule 
determining any one class of “undesigned” implications of the postulate of profit maximization? Are 
there any kinds of conditions under which no producer is expected to do so? Admittedly, it may not 
matter for most purposes whether producers try to maximize their profits to the very last cent, but 
given the wide range of functions which the profit-maximization postulate serves in economics can 
any practical deviation from the assumption be confidently termed completely inconsequential? 
Likewise, that are the rules for finding the “undesigned” classes of implications of the theorem of 
negatively sloping demand for non-inferior goods? Friedman supplies no answer to these questions. 
The only support for his view that can be inferred from his essay is the indication that the same firm 
or industry may be regarded as perfectly competitive for some purposes, but not for others. 
However, economic theory, in its most unlimited form, does not clearly assert the omnipresence of 
perfect competition. Hence the specification of rules concerning the proper application of this 
assumption, or the supply of guidelines determining when perfect competition can and cannot be 
assumed, does not plainly entail any “undesigned” classes of implications. Moreover, Friedman’s one 
or two examples of legitimate and illegitimate applications of the assumption of perfect competition 
to a single industry do not provide a single tenable rule of application regarding perfect competition, 
let alone with respect to any other economic assertions. While these examples may be fairly 
convincing, it would be very difficult to infer a general rule of application from them.28 
                                                          
26 Friedman (1948), p. 24. 
27 Friedman (1948), p. 25. 
28 Friedman (1948), pp. 36-37. Archibald (1961) has made a highly related point with regard to Friedman’s 
major example, involving the cigarette industry (esp. pp. 3-4), and in return has received a sharp rebuke from 
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 Aside from the practical problem of identifying rules of application in economics, it may be 
observed, more generally, that it any “undesigned” classes of implications could be properly 
identified, they could then be eliminated. In other words, if we could pinpoint precisely something 
that we do not wish to say, we could cease to say it. Thus, in order to substantiate his contention 
that certain adverse test results can be completely disregarded, Friedman should be able to show 
that, by introducing appropriate qualifications and conditions, he could narrow the empirical scope 
of economic theory without impairing the explanatory and predictive value of the theory. Until he 
can meet this test, there is every reason to think that all negative findings must be accepted as 
disconfirmatory.29 
 To elaborate on this view beyond the point reached in the preceding section, assume that 
there is reason to suspect, along with Friedman, that some of the testimony advanced, say, against 
the profit-maximization postulate does not impair the theoretical statement. Granted, however, the 
inability to reconcile the postulate satisfactorily with the contrary evidence, how can we be sure ? 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Friedman (1963) (see also Archibald (1963) for his rejoinder). In his answer, Friedman maintains that his 
example is intended to show the importance of specifying the rules of application, rather than existing 
knowledge of those rules. But I must confess that, whatever Friedman may say elsewhere in his paper 
regarding the need for developing and elaborating the economic rules, like Archibald, I cannot help but read 
the cigarette example and the entire surrounding context as an attempt to show the current availability of such 
rules and the neglect of the critics of economic theory of their existence. The following three opening 
statements of paragraphs shortly prior to the cigarette example set the tone for the illustration : 
“The confusion between descriptive accuracy and analytical relevance has led not only to criticisms of 
economic theory on largely irrelevant ground but also to misunderstanding of economic theory and 
misdirection of effort to repair supposed defects” (Friedman (1948), p. 34). 
“This tendency is perhaps most clearly illustrated by the interpretation given to the concepts of ‘perfect 
competition’ and ‘monopoly’ and the development of the theory of ‘monopolistic’ or ‘imperfect competition’” 
(ibid.). 
“As always the hypothesis as a whole [“that, for many problems, firms could be grouped into ‘industries’ such 
that the similarities among the firms in each group were more important than the differences among them”] 
consists not only of this abstract model but also of a set of rules, mostly implicit and suggested by example, for 
identifying actual firms with one or the other ideal type and for classifying firms into industries” (ibid., pp 35-
36). 
As may be gleaned from these quotations, the general trend of Friedman’s argument is that, in refusing ever to 
apply various assumptions to particular economic units, the critics of economic theory, Marshallian and 
otherwise, are blind to the existence of certain “rules”. 
29 Cf. the following statement by Koopmans (1957, p. 139) : “To state a set of postulates, and then to exempt a 
sub-class of their implications from verification is a curiously roundabout way of specifying the content of a 
theory that is regarded as open to empirical refutation”. See also Nagel (1963), pp. 217-18. 
There is a great deal of reciprocity between the argument at this point and Samuelson’s (1963) criticism of 
Friedman. Samuelson stresses that whatever is known to be false in an argument should simply be purged. 
While this view is correct, I think it bears emphasis that to remove false information from a statement requires 
knowledge of the false classes of implications rather than merely the false instances themselves. In other 
words though a statement may be known to be imperfect, there may be no clear avenue of improvement. 
Samuelson’s failure to give adequate consideration to this point has led him, in my view, to an important error 
in criticizing Friedman. Samuelson supposes that a favorable outcome of a check of an implication of a general 
statement only supports the whole statement if no parts of the statement are known to be false.  However, 
since there may be no obvious way to remedy the defects of the statement, the only suitable interpretation of 
a favorable test result may be as adding a degree of confirmation to the statement as a whole. The basis for 
this interpretation is that every favorable result enhances the chances that the statement, as constituted, will 
yield true predictions in the future. However, Samuelson’s error in refusing to accept some positive results as 
confirmatory is far less serious than that of Friedman in supposing that some negative outcomes are non-
disconfirmatory. 
13 
 
Even though the negative results, as such, appear trivial, the part of the theory to which the results 
pertain may carry latent significance. In any general theory including many theorems, the 
interrelations among statements and definitions may be extremely complex, and any portion of the 
theory may be an unsuspected cause of many false predictions. Furthermore, even if certain practical 
errors in the theory have not born any adverse effects in the past, they could become catastrophic in 
the future. Theories are supposed to provide new and untried hypotheses, and whatever may be the 
past record, later hypotheses may be highly influenced by on-going theoretical mistakes. It follows 
that any errors uncovered in assumptions may also be considered as clues regarding the possible 
improvement of the theory. 
 There is also a noteworthy and curious inconsistency in Friedman’s position. While 
minimizing the importance of contradictory findings, he sometime displays a lively appreciation of 
the impact of evidence supporting any fragment of a theory on the entire theoretical edifice.30 It is 
quite rational to believe that every favorable result confers some degree of confirmation on every 
part of a theory and all logically affiliated hypotheses. But granted this view, it is difficult to see how 
the converse effect of negative results can be denied. 
 
E – Economic theory as a set of “as if” statements 
 In connection with the problem of “undesigned” implications, a particular semantic proposal 
by Friedman that is enjoying some following should be discussed; namely, the idea of regarding 
assumptions as “as if” statements. Specifically, the proposal is that assumption be construed to mean 
that certain events take place as if the assumptions were true, instead of being understood as out-
right assertions. The basis for the appeal of this construal is obvious: It would mean that 
assumptions, as conventionally stated, are never even supposed to be true. Thus, the construal is in 
keeping with Friedman’s view that certain fallacies in assumptions have no bearing. In addition, the 
construal answers the conspicuous demand of many economists for some sort of logical protection 
against unfriendly criticism of economic theory. A quotation will make Friedman’s proposal clearer: 
“Consider the problem of predicting the shots made by an expert billiard player. It seem not 
at all unreasonable that excellent predictions would be yielded by the hypothesis that the billiard 
player made his shot as if he knew the complicated mathematical formulas that would give the 
optimum directions of travel, could estimate accurately by eye the angles, etc, describing the 
location of the balls, could make lightning calculations from the formulas, and could then make the 
balls travel in the direction indicated by the formulas… . 
It is only a short step from these examples to the economic hypothesis that under a wide 
range of circumstances individual firms behave as if they were seeking rationally to maximize their 
expected return… and had full knowledge of the data needed to succeed in this attempt.”31 
 The “as if” construal of economic assumptions, whatever its appeal, has some important 
drawbacks. In particular, the construal is inconsistent with the explanatory and predictive function of 
economic theory and scientific statements in general. With regard to the explanatory function, 
suppose the question arises why a given individual shoots expert pool. The answer that he shoots 
                                                          
30 See, for example, n. 9 above and the associated quotation in the text. 
31 Friedman (1948), p. 21. 
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expert pool because he is a competent mathematician, and can make the balls travel in accord with 
complicated calculations, etc., can at least be accepted. But the reply that he shoots pool as if he 
were a competent mathematician, and so forth, is beside the point.  This answer concerns the 
question “how possibly” rather than the question “why”. The correct answer to “how possibly”, of 
course, is completely independent of the actual state of affairs and the genuine reasons why. Thus, 
Friedman might as well have said that the billiard player shoot the balls into the pockets as if the 
balls were magnetized and the pockets were magnets ; or as if there were invisible ridge in the table 
shifting in accord with the player’s will and leading the balls into the pockets. The question “why” 
calls for an assertion of fact, suitable for an introduction with the term “because”. Statements of 
possibilities and suggested analogies do not constitute explanations. In sum, the economic postulates 
cannot appear in an “as if” form when they are used in explanation. Since the postulates frequently 
serve in order to explain, the “as if” construal would seriously misrepresent these statements. 
 The “as if” formulation is also impossible to reconcile with the predictive function of general 
scientific statements. Departing from the rather trivial example of the expert pool player, consider 
the assertion that businessmen behave as if they were trying to maximize their profits, or (if such an 
alternative be possible) that under certain conditions businessmen behave as if they were 
attempting to maximize profits. Given the requisite circumstances, if any, what can we predict, or in 
other words, what observable implications can we derive from this “as if” statement? Unfortunately, 
no observable implications seem to follow. If businessmen act only as if trying to maximize profits, 
then evidently they do not exactly try to maximize profits, at least not all of the time, and perhaps 
sometime they do not even try to maximize profits at all. As a result, no specific conclusion about 
businessmen’s actions, however vague and tentative, can be strictly derived from the statement. In 
basing any prediction on the assumption of profit maximization, it may safely be concluded that 
there is implicit reliance on the declaration that, maybe only under some specified conditions, and 
maybe only with regard to some defined subgroup, businessmen really and truly try to maximize 
their profits. 
 Since “as if” statements can serve neither to explain nor to predict, Friedman’s proposal to 
interpret the economic postulate as “as if” statements should be rejected.32 Broadly speaking, in 
using the economic postulates to explain and predict, we commit ourselves to what they say about 
the world, and thus it would seem almost mandatory to interpret them accordingly as 
straightforward declarations of fact. 
F – Conclusion 
 In conclusion, lest the point be lost amid the criticisms, I would like to emphasize the 
presence of an important measure of agreement with Friedman in these pages. Most notably, I 
                                                          
32 A similar objection can be raised against all of the weak characterizations of economic theory mentioned in 
the introduction, such as “box of analytical tools”, “filing cabinet”, “conceptual framework”, etc. Admittedly, 
these characterizations are correct in stressing that economic theory provides a compact, efficient way of 
structuring and storing masses of information, which is useful, for instance, in writing textbooks and 
cataloguing data ; and they are also correct in stressing that the theory helps in raising questions and 
suggesting possible replies. But since the theory is continually employed in the further effort to explain and 
predict the future, it does not seem accurate to depict economic theory as a mere analytical device (for viewing 
things, asking questions, compiling knowledge, etc.). In employing these weak characterizations, therefore, it 
may be said that economists have unduly modest pretentions. The most acceptable characterization, I submit, 
is that economic theory is a set of general statements about the world. 
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concur fully with his view that the disconfirmation of an assumption, as such, does not disqualify any 
hypothesis. First, false “auxiliary” assumptions impede testing but do not carry the least suggestion 
that the hypothesis is false.33 Second, false “generative” assumptions may bear true and non-trivial 
implications. A hypothesis about price behavior founded partly on the profit-maximization postulate 
could be true, granted that the postulate is false. There is no doubt that, in arguing this general point 
of view, Friedman faces strong opposition from many quarters. Many writers, mostly in the social 
sciences and humanities, evidently regard assumptions as the pillars on which whole theories and 
even entire disciplines stand. Judging from some accounts, science is a pyramid with assumptions on 
the bottom and empirical knowledge sitting precariously on top. Friedman’s strenuous objection to 
this extreme position is amply justified. Allowing that assumptions are often an important source of 
support for hypotheses, that they affect what is found, surely it is fundamentally the facts that 
support theories, rather than the other way around. If all corroborating evidence for empirical 
theories were lost, it would seem that theories and their assumptions would soon collapse. On the 
other hand, the destruction of all assumptions could not negate all the previous testimony of our 
senses. As Friedman ably points out, although this is by no means the only relevant consideration, 
the facts apprehended at any moment in time are always compatible with infinitely many 
assumptions. 
 Unfortunately, however, Friedman does not confine his remarks to the previous points. (To 
some extent, however, he fosters the quite contrary impression that everything that he says is 
logically attendant; witness the disarming title of his main section, concerning the irrelevance of the 
truth of assumptions: “Can a Hypothesis Be Tested by the Realism of Its Assumptions?”) Friedman 
also states that a test of assumptions is completely pointless, unless, as he mentions only after 
concluding his main arguments, a few special kind of circumstances hold. This position must be 
unreservedly rejected. As noted, the greater the deviations between test conditions and “auxiliary” 
assumptions, the lower the ability to perform tests ; and the greater the extent to which “generative” 
assumptions are inaccurate, the lower is the probability that the derived hypotheses are true. More 
generally, with regard to “generative” assumptions, the more unrealistic these assumptions, the 
weaker the basis for relying on them in order to develop hypotheses or hunches. Hence, contrary to 
Friedman, tests of economic assumptions are generally useful in testing and appraising hypotheses, 
and in indicating possible avenues of improvement in theory and hypotheses.34 
 
                                                          
33 Cf. Nagel (1956), p. 215. 
34 Nagel (1963) fully corroborate these conclusions. He reasons that if “unrealistic” is understood in the sense 
of false, rather than abstract, Friedman’s arguments are wrong. Nagel’s article suffers, however, from a failure 
(or at least the strong symptoms thereof) correctly to assess Friedman’s main objectives. Perhaps intending to 
give the benefit of a doubt, Nagel interprets Friedman’s support of unrealistic assumptions strictly as an effort 
to defend the use of abstract theory. That is, Nagel does not acknowledge Friedman’s interest in undercutting 
the rational basis for testing assumptions and in denying the relevance of the results of tests of assumptions. 
Concomitantly, Nagel focuses largely on what seem to me to be a subsidiary aspect of Friedman’s position, 
namely, the view that abstract theoretical terms could, if so desired, be completely eliminated from 
statements. Nagel regard this view as an essential link in Friedman’s effort to establish the acceptability of 
abstract theory whereas, if my reading is correct, the view is a secondary accompaniment of Friedman’s 
attempt to show that certain aspects of assumptions are “undesigned” and that the facts relating to them are 
negligible. Whatever the true significance of this view, Nagel’s refutation is conclusive. I may also note that 
Nagel does not mention Friedman’s argument for “undesigned” classes of implications. Yet on all issue where 
this paper and Nagel’s meet, there is, I believe, total agreement. 
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III – The Machlup View 
A – Introduction 
 In his article on “The Problem of Verification in Economics”,35 Machlup adopts Friedman’s 
view of the irrelevancy of tests of assumptions, but only with respect to one particular type of 
assumptions, namely, “fundamental assumptions”. Other assumptions, Machlup believes, require 
some degree of corroboration in an experiment.36 In support of his position regarding “fundamental 
assumptions”, Machlup follows a special line of reasoning. To begin with, he holds that “fundamental 
assumptions” cannot be tested “directly” or “independently”. To quote him: “There is no way of 
subjecting fundamental assumptions to independent verification”37 ; and “Fundamental assumptions 
are not directly testable and cannot be refuted by empirical investigation”.38 In addition, Machlup 
also argues, particularly with respect to economics, that “fundamental assumptions” are not 
supposed to be tested “independently” since they can be properly understood as making no factual 
declarations. These two arguments are not fully consistent: If “direct” tests of “fundamental 
assumptions” are entirely precluded, as the first argument says, then the argument that these 
assumptions may be properly interpreted in a way rendering “direct” tests inappropriate is 
completely superfluous. Nevertheless, Machlup develops both arguments together and does not 
separate the two.39 
 Machlup’s stand is of interest largely as an example of a certain kind of opposition to direct 
testing of theoretical postulates. Concern with his stand is also dictated by his taunting suggestion 
that his conclusions are commonly accepted in the field of the philosophy of science. “Logicians and 
philosophers of science”, he asserts, “have long tried to make this perfectly clear”.40 No attempt will 
be made to deal with Machlup’s position as a whole ; the aim will be only to treat a few important 
selected topics in connection with his stand, namely : (1) the distinction between “direct” and 
“indirect” tests ; (2) the argument that “fundamental assumptions” are inherently impossible to test 
directly ; and (3) the argument that it is illegitimate to test “fundamental assumptions” because they 
can be appropriately understood as rules, or more generally, as making no declarations about facts. 
 
                                                          
35 Machlup (1955). 
36 See Machlup (1955), pp. 8-16, and the interesting paragraph on pp. 18-19. Machlup fails to recognize his 
disagreement with Friedman regarding “non-fundamental” assumptions. According to Machlup, the “only 
serious flaw in the otherwise excellent essay” by Friedman is the failure to consider the requirement of 
“understandability” (ibid., p. 17, n. 42). 
37 Machlup (1955), p. 9. 
38 Machlup (1955), p. 11. 
39 Machlup’s confusion of the two arguments is particularly evident on p. 11 of the article. Later on, in his 
rejoinder to a reply by Terence W. Hutchison, Machlup (1956, p. 487) admits the error, saying : “Perhaps it was 
confusing when in addition to stating that these fundamental assumptions need not be independently verified, 
I also indicated that they cannot be so verified”. Also in the same general passage (ibid., p. 488), Machlup 
abandons the argument that “fundamental assumptions” are inherently impossible to test directly. In his 
subsequent writing, however, including one lengthy methodological article, Machlup makes a number of cross-
references to his 1955 essay, without indicating the least change in his position (see Machlup (1960) and 1963, 
pp. 48, 79). It may also be noted that his reply to Hutchison (1956) is a spirited defense on the whole (see 
Machlup (1956)). The original article by Machlup and the subsequent exchange with Hutchison have been 
translated into Italian in a book under the authorship of Machlup, Hutchison, and Emile Grunberg (1959).  
40 Machlup (1955), p. 10. 
17 
 
B – The distinction between direct and indirect tests 
 The distinction between direct and indirect tests plays a central part in the writing of 
Friedman and Machlup, since both authors contend that, for one reason or another, postulates can 
be properly tested only in a roundabout or indirect way. The reason for discussing the distinction 
with regard to Machlup is that he deals with it more explicitly and more satisfactorily than Friedman. 
 Friedman presents the distinction by contrasting testing by mere “perception” of “descriptive 
accuracy” with testing by checking the validity of derived implications ; and Machlup does essentially 
the same at one point.41 The distinction between comparing a statement against the facts and 
checking its implications, however, is highly superficial. Every test involves a checking of something 
which follows from a statement or set of statements by implication. Thus, while Friedman may wish 
to regard an investigation of the propensities of individual businessmen a, b, c, …, n, to maximize 
profits as a mere test of the descriptive accuracy of the profit-maximization postulate, the fact 
remains that this test constitutes a check of bona fide implications. At best, the distinction between 
checking a statement, as such, and checking its implications can be understood as one between a 
check of a whole as opposed to a check of only a part of a statement. The latter distinction, however, 
makes sense only with regard to statement whose entire empirical content is amenable to checking 
with a finite set of observations (for example, “this tree is an elm”). In the instance of statements 
yielding an infinite set of implications requiring separate observations, which comprises the whole 
class of general theoretical statements, checking the entire empirical content of the statements is 
not feasible. 
 In an effort to advance beyond the crude distinction between comparing statements against 
the facts and checking their implications, Machlup asserts that a direct test entails the derivation of 
implications from a statement alone whereas an indirect test involves the derivation of implications 
from a statement in conjunction with other statements. This proposed definition, while a step in the 
right direction, is also inadequate. The definition provides no basis for a distinction between direct 
and indirect tests of conditional statements, which constitute, of course, the dominant portion of the 
entire output of scientific hypotheses. A conditional statement, by itself, yields no observable 
implications whatever, and can never be tested in complete isolation from other statements.42 The 
statement “if x, then y” does not imply anything about the world at any particular spatio-temporal 
location unless it is brought together with an affirmation that x is true. The combined assertion of “if 
x, then y” and “x is true” implies y and whatever observable implications y may bear. Thus, according 
to the proposed definition of a direct test, no direct test of the main assertion “if x, then y” is 
possible, and all tests of conditional statements are indirect.43 
                                                          
41 To quote the relevant passage in Machlup  (1955, p. 7): “The point to emphasize is that Mill does not propose 
to put the assumptions of economic theory to empirical tests, but only the predicted results that are deduced 
from them” (p. 7). 
42 Though, of course, the statement “if x, then y”, by itself, does bear infinitely many conditional implications. 
For one thing, the statement implies itself. More significantly, the statement yield implications of the form “if z 
implies x, then z implies y”. 
43 To offer an economic example, consider the conditional assertion: “If wages are inflexible, then a fall in the 
aggregate demand for goods will cause unemployment”. This assertion, alone, says nothing whatever about 
observable conditions at any specific point in space and time. But a conjunction of this assertion and the 
statements that “wages are inflexible” and “government spending on goods and services has declined” implies 
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 The only tenable distinction between a direct and an indirect test, agreeing with the general 
intentions of Machlup and Friedman, is one between a test that employs only statements that are 
logically essential for the derivation of observable implications and a test that uses additional 
statements. In other words, an indirect test involves the checking of implications derived from a 
statement together with one or more others that are not required in order to draw some observable 
implications by means of the first. Machlup’s reply in his exchange with T.W. Hutchison44 indicates an 
attempt, although not an altogether successful one, to formulate the distinction in this way.45 
 
C – The impossibility of testing “fundamental assumptions” 
 Machlup’s argument that “fundamental assumptions” are impossible to test directly rest 
essentially on the experience in physics.46 As frequently noted, the physical postulates cannot be 
directly tested. Like many other observers, Machlup is extremely impressed with this point and prone 
to generalize on its basis. However, the difficulty of testing the physical postulates in any relatively 
straightforward manner is easy to diagnose ; it arises from the fact that these postulates contain 
various highly abstract terms, such as atom and molecule, whose counterpart in nature are not 
subject to immediate sensory observation.  It does not follow that there are significant barriers to 
direct testing of postulates in other disciplines, particularly in a field as distantly related to physics as 
economics.47 Moreover, the experience of physics does not signify that “fundamental assumptions”, 
in general, are impossible to test directly.48 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
a present rise in unemployment. Thus, on the basis of the present definition, the only possible test of the 
hypothesis is indirect. 
44 See Hutchinson (1956) and Machlup (1956). 
45 Machlup (1956), pp. 484-85. 
46 See Machlup, (1955), pp. 9-10. 
47 Cf. Koopmans (1957), p. 135. In Machlup (1960), he maintains that the theoretical concepts of economics are 
highly abstract, and thus, by intimation, supports his earlier thesis that the economic postulates require 
indirect testing. However, Machlup’s argument rest entirely on the supposed classification of all scientific 
concepts into two groups: “operational concepts” and “pure constructs”. “Operational concepts” are those 
which can be defined as a set of operations. “Pure constructs”, on the other hand, are either mathematical, or 
else bear only “some indirect reference to facts of experience” and are “derived through idealization, heroic 
abstraction, or inventions” (ibid., p. 577). In order to show that the economic concepts of “price” and 
“quantity” are “theoretical” or “pure constructs”, Machlup is satisfied to point out the inadequacy of any 
purported operational definition of either term. Given, however, Machlup’s own demonstration of the extreme 
weaknesses of “operationalism”, or the thesis that all scientific concepts should be “operational”, his bipartite 
division of concept is untenable. For example, as Machlup indicates quite clearly (ibid., p. 558), all objects of 
sensory perception, such as ant or lilac, cannot be operationally defined, lest the concepts be made 
synonymous with the operations of the observer in identifying these objects. Yet the concepts of an “ant” and 
a “lilac” can hardly be regarded as “pure constructs”. The need for some intermediary classification (or 
classifications) is clear, and the possibility that many economic concepts belong to this (these) intermediary 
grouping (s) is equally plain. Thus Machlup’s argument for the high abstractness of the economic concepts does 
not stand. 
48 Machlup provides very little evidence of philosophical support for his view. His two lengthy quotations from 
prominent philosophers (Machlup (1955), p. 10) do not say, as he supposes, that scientific postulates are 
impossible to test directly, but rather that postulates which are only indirectly testable have proven to be 
extremely valuable in science. His most impressive citation of philosophical support is the statement by Richard 
B. Braithwaite (1953): “The empirical testing of the deductive system is effected by testing the lower-level 
hypotheses in the system”. This assertion, though in seeming agreement with Machlup, actually offers him no 
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 To elucidate the falsehood of the thesis that empirical postulates cannot be tested directly, 
first, the status of a statement as a postulate in a theoretical system implies nothing about the 
testability of that statement. Any general statement can serve as a postulate in a deductive system. 
Furthermore, a “lower-level” hypothesis in one deductive system can be a “fundamental 
assumption” in another. To carry the argument further, there is no reason, in principle, why in a 
certain system the theoretical postulates might not be more readily testable than the theorems and 
many of the “lower-level” hypotheses. In one of his writings, the noted philosopher Rudolf Carnap 
emphasizes this practical possibility,49 which derives mainly from the feasibility of introducing new 
terms at any step in a deductive sequence. Since the terms which are imported after a deductive 
process has begun can be highly technical, the derived statements of a theory may be more abstract 
and less susceptible to direct testing than the underived one. A single economic example, intended 
to be correct, but not to supply the ground for any generalization about abstract relations in 
economics,50 will suffice. The assertion that indifference curve are convex, everyone will probably 
admit, is more abstract than the statement that consumer always prefer variety to uniformity of 
goods. Yet, as is generally well known, the latter assertion can serve as a partial basis for deriving the 
convexity of indifference curve. The main reason for this condition, evidently, is that the special 
terms “indifference curve” and “convex” are injected at a late point in the argument.51 
 
D – The illegitimacy of direct tests of empirical “rules” 
 Perhaps the most challenging part of Machlup’s stand, requiring some detailed attention, is 
his view that the economic postulates ought not, or cannot legitimately be tested directly because 
they can be understood not to be assertions of fact. His main support for the belief, as the reply to 
Hutchison explicitly shows, is the following: 
Logicians have long debated the possibility of propositions being synthetic and yet a priori, 
and physicists are still not quite agreed whether the “laws” of mechanics are analytical definitions or 
empirical facts. The late philosopher Felix Kaufmann introduced as a middle category the so-called 
“rules of procedure”, which are neither synthetic in the sense that they are falsifiable by 
contravening observations nor a priori in the sense that they are independent of experience; they are 
and remain accepted as long as they have heuristic value, but will be rejected in favor of other rules 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
assistance. Braithwaite use the term “lowest-level” hypothesis to mean any general statement which is last in a 
deductive order, regardless of the simplicity of the derivation. Moreover, in the relevant context, the 
statement refers unambiguously to the possibility of a direct test. Machlup (1955, p. 6) also claims that Nassau 
W. Senior, John Elliot Cairnes, and John Stuart Mill denied “the independent objective verifiability of the 
fundamental assumptions” of economic theory. There is no doubt, however, that all three of these writers, 
held that at least some of the “fundamental” economic assumptions could be independently (and 
“objectively”) verified, for example, the “Law of population”. For explicit indications see Senior (1875), pp. 77, 
88-89, and Mill (1844), pp. 145-46. Moreover, Mill (1844) clearly opposes the notion that the economic 
postulates require no direct testing. In this essay, Mill vigorously argues that the main economic assumptions 
should never be put to work without priorly ascertaining their general applicability to the particular case 
involved (see ibid., pp. 139-41, and 149-50). 
49 Rudolf Carnap (1939), esp. p.  64. 
50 In this connection see the interesting though rather unusual comment by Herbert Simon (1963). 
51 Cf. Hutchison (1956), pp. 481-82. 
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(assumptions) which seem to serve their explanatory functions more successfully.52 
 To quote a closely related passage in the “Rejoinder”: 
“In his comment on the nature and significance of the maximization postulate Professor 
Hutchison conveys the impression that he recognizes as scientifically legitimate only two kinds of 
statements: Propositions which by empirical tests can, at least conceivably, be proved to be false, 
and definitions without empirical content. If so, he rejects a third category of propositions used in 
most theoretical systems: the heuristic postulates and idealized assumptions in abstract models of 
interdependent constructs useful in the explanation and predictions of observable phenomena… . 
Logicians have long recognized this intermediate category of propositions, which are neither 
a priori nor a posteriori in the strict sense of these terms.”53 
 On the basis of the general content of Machlup’s essay, his argument can be interpreted 
substantially as follows: 
Step I. Logicians “have long recognized” the presence of statements which are neither “synthetic” nor 
“a priori” ; 
Step II. Some special terms have been addressed to such statements; 
Step III. These terms are applicable to the postulates of economic theory; and therefore 
Step IV. Like all other statements which are suited to bear those labels, the economic postulates 
ought not to be tested independently. 
 In order to avoid prolonged discussion, I will confine myself to the principal issues related to 
economics. It is convenient to begin with Step III. With close bearing to this step, one can question 
Machlup’s assertion (which does not emerge fully above) of the equivalence or at least equal 
admissibility of a variety of different portrayals of the economic postulates. Machlup is explicitly 
indifferent as to whether the postulates are understood as “rules of procedure”, “heuristic 
postulates”, “idealized assumptions”, “useful fictions”, “resolutions”, or “definitional assumptions”, 
to list only his most prominent appellations.54 Yet some of these terms differ greatly, and the 
application of all of the appellations to the economic postulates does not seem appropriate. 
 The conception of the economic postulates as “definitional assumptions”, if not illogical, is 
certainly misleading. The adjective “definitional” is usually understood to pertain either to sentences 
defining a concept or term, or to a particular concept or term. Given this construal of the term, the 
economic postulates are clearly not “definitional”. Whatever other meaning may be assigned to 
“definitional”, the term retains the connotation “necessarily true”. Yet we know that the assertion of 
non-optimizing behavior, for example, involves no inherent contradiction. More generally, it would 
spell a great misfortune for economics if the economic postulates were necessarily true, since then 
all of their implications would be empirically irrefutable and no hypotheses or predictions could be 
                                                          
52 Machlup (1955), p. 16. 
53 Machlup (1956), p. 486. 
54 See Machlup (1955), pp. 9, 16 and (1956), pp. 486, 487, including n. 5. 
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derived from them.55 
 Nor is it clear that all economic postulates can be interpreted as “idealized assumptions”. On 
the basis of current philosophical usage, an “idealized” assumption is one which holds true only 
under certain limiting conditions which can never be even closely approximated in practice outside of 
the laboratory. Accordingly, the “assumption” of a “pure gas”, for instance, is “idealized”. If this 
special philosophical meaning is accepted, then objective factors largely determine whether a given 
statement is “idealized” or not, and it cannot simply be postulated at will that the “fundamental” 
economic assumptions are “idealized”. In particular, “optimizing behavior” is not a very convincing 
example of an “idealized assumption”. 
 Avowedly, though, the postulates of economic theory can be interpreted as “procedural 
rules”, “heuristic postulates”, “useful fictions”, or “resolutions”. Consequently, the subsequent 
treatment of Machlup’s position will be restricted to these possible appellations. Despite some 
difference in meaning between the four terms, the notion of a “rule” seems to approximate all four, 
and therefore I will focus on the interpretation of the economic postulates as rules. 
 Machlup strongly suggests that there are some logically unimpeachable grounds, established 
by philosophers, for viewing the economic postulates as rules. Judging from his account, it has been 
conclusively shown that certain scientific propositions, particularly theoretical postulates, are not 
statements about the world, but rules or something similar. Yet his only attempt to corroborate this 
impression is the consideration, implicit in his reference to Felix Kaufmann, that some propositions 
that relate to experience (and thus are not “a priori”) are retained in science despite contradictions 
by the facts (and therefore are not “synthetic”). According to Kaufmann, Machlup’s principal 
authority, any proposition which is known to contain a single false implication, and is nevertheless 
retained, must be understood as a rule of procedure.56 Kaufmann’s position, however, is highly 
debatable. At most, Kaufmann is able to show that, if false propositions are interpreted as 
statements instead of rules, there is some difficulty in reconciling the use of these propositions with 
prediction. In support of the view that false scientific propositions can be rationally understood as 
statements rather than rules, though, it can be argued (1) that in predicting, one questions whether 
any of the operating premises are really false; and (2) that predictions can always be based on false 
statements if sufficient allowance is made for the probability that the predictions are false. In fact, 
                                                          
55 Hutchinson is responsible for considerable confusion, I believe, on the question of the logical truth-status of 
the economic theoretical statements. In Hutchison (1938), he argues that the postulates and theorems of 
economic theory are tautological and hence necessarily true. Though by this time Hutchinson may have altered 
his opinion, his early view continues to exert influence among economists, and therefore deserves attention. 
His sole supporting arguments for his 1938 position are : first, that “in formulating a system of definitions one is 
in one and  the same process formulating a series of analytical-tautological propositions of pure theory” (ibid., 
p. 30) ; and second, that every proposition which follows by implication within a deductive system is a 
tautology. With regard to the first argument, the construction of a theoretical vocabulary does not necessitate 
any statements at all, and granted that tautologies can usually be manufactured easily, any set of technical 
terms can be used to formulate non-tautological statements, given a sufficient vocabulary and adequate 
syntactical rules. Otherwise, of course, no technical terms could ever serve in order to obtain empirical 
statements. As for the view that all theoretical implications are tautological, which applies to theorems and not 
postulates, here again a logical mistake is involved. If statement X is derived from Y, then X is necessarily true if 
Y is true, but not if Y is false. Hutchinson’s view easily leads to a reductio ad absurdum since every statement is 
theoretically derivable from infinitely many others. Incidentally, among those who have indorsed Hutchison’s 
argument are some eminent economists. 
56 See Felix Kaufmann (1944), pp. 83-89. 
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the general trend in philosophy seems opposed to the interpretation of any empirical propositions as 
rules.57 On the basis of widespread philosophical opinion, every empirical proposition in science can 
be formulated and understood simply as a factual statement. Thus, as might have been supposed 
apart from any philosophical considerations, there is no logical necessity to view the economic 
postulates as rule. 
 Suppose, however, that the economic postulates are nevertheless construed as rules. Then 
there arises the central problem connected with Machlup’s argument, involving Step IV: How would 
the “rules” interpretation of the economic postulates affect the possibility and legitimacy of 
independent tests ? Machlup seems to suppose an enormous adverse effect. Bur in order to explain, 
he always fall back upon the idea of a contradiction in the very notion of a direct test of a rule. This 
contradiction, it may be shown, is illusory. 
 To begin with, a proposition cannot be blindly accepted in science because of its construal as 
a rule. Science is not an art or game of skill, where the object is to accomplish a certain end within 
defined constraints. The object of science is to explain and predict events, and the adequacy of any 
rule employed in science must be judged in the light of their contributions to this objective. Thus, 
even supposing that the construal of empirical postulates as rules dispose of the question of their 
“truth”, “falsehood”, “confirmation”, or “disconfirmation”, the issue of the “usefulness”, “adequacy”, 
“reliability”, or “correctness” of the postulates will still remain.58 This issue must be resolved on the 
basis of empirical findings. 
 Machlup, in fact, recognizes that indirect tests affect the usefulness of empirical rules. But if 
the construal of postulates as rules does not remove the need for testing, the construal, as such, 
does not justify any opposition to direct testing. Consequently, Machlup’s objection to the direct 
testing of postulates is not implicit in the construal of postulates as rules. So far as I can see, none of 
the proponents of the construal of theoretical postulates as rules, including Kaufmann,59 have ever 
advocated self-imposed limitations on direct testing. Moreover, Machlup’s view cannot be justified. 
To cite the main criticism, inherent in the discussion of Friedman’s thesis, the results of direct tests 
bear on the usefulness of empirical “rules”. The most pertinent previous argument is that the 
                                                          
57 See Nagel’s “Review” of Stephen Toulmin (1954), reprinted in Nagel (1956), pp. 303-15; Hempel (1958b); and 
also H. Gavin Alexander (1958). 
58 At one point in Machlup (1956, p. 486), he does not rely on the interpretation of “fundamental assumptions” 
in some non-declarative form, such as “rules” or “resolutions”, etc., in defending the view that “fundamental 
assumptions” are neither true nor false and cannot be disconfirmed. Instead, he implicitly consents to regard 
the postulates as assertions, bur argues (1) that they predicate only “about ideal constructs”; and (2) that “they 
cannot be ‘falsified’ by observed facts … because auxiliary assumptions can be brought in to establish 
correspondence with almost any kind of facts”. These remarks lack cogency. First, according to general 
understanding in logic, assertions are either “true” or “false” whether they predicate about ideal constructs of 
anything else (cf. Kaufmann (1944), p. 87). Second, to import new “auxiliary assumptions” in the face of 
contradictory evidence does not avert the possibility of disconfirmation, but merely revises the original 
assertion. Upon complete formulation, the “auxiliary assumptions” of every statement are implicit. The only 
reasonable ground for arguing that “fundamental assumptions” cannot be disconfirmed and are neither true 
nor false, in my opinion, is that they possess some non-declarative form. This is the sole inferable ground for 
the argument in Machlup’s original article. 
59 Kaufmann base his designation of certain empirical propositions as rules exclusively on their actual treatment 
in the relevant disciplines. While raising the question of the best method of determining the reliability of these 
particular “rules”, he offers no answer (see Kaufmann (1944), pp. 85-87, 233). It is also noteworthy that much 
of Kaufmann’s emphasis is on different kinds of “rules”. 
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correspondence between “generative” assumptions and facts alter the probability of true 
predictions, and thus modifies the “reliability”, “usefulness”, etc., of those assumptions, or in terms 
of the present convention, “rules”. 
 
IV – Conclusion 
 Having argued extensively the significance of tests of economic assumptions, it should be 
emphasized one last time in closing that there has been no effort in this paper to promote the idea 
that true assumptions are absolutely essential in scientific work. Indeed, since a single false 
implication suffices to render an entire statement false, it would be genuinely astounding if any 
moderately important true scientific hypothesis were in stock. The central argument in these pages 
has been that every inaccuracy in assumptions is disadvantageous. The essential basis for this 
conclusion is that every falsehood in assumptions either hinders testing or potentially gives rise to 
false hypotheses and predictions. This conclusion, which is not new in economics, as noted in the 
introduction, currently requires stress due to the serious challenge of Friedman and Machlup. 
 The argument in this paper does not imply, it is important to add, that economic theory 
suffers grave damage each time a negative result of a test of an economic assumption takes place. 
The actual disconfirmatory significance of any negative test finding always depends largely on the 
individual circumstances involved; in particular, the character of the experiment, the quality of the 
execution, and the nature of the results. Thus, the outcome of former tests of the economic 
postulates may be barely detrimental. But even if this were so, future tests of these assumptions 
might prove very upsetting. In general, the potential impact of a disconfirmatory test result 
corresponds closely to the intensity of current reliance on the statement in question. On this basis, 
and in order to highlight the significance of the preceding argument, I may venture the opinion with 
regard to economic that there are certain conceivable outcomes of tests of profit maximization 
which, if they actually took place, would prove devastating. 
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